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Were democratic institutions in America to be measured by
the results which have been attained in the local management of
cities, rather than in the State or nation-at-large, the verdict of
history would undoubtedly pronounce them a failure. A people
who have proven themselves in the highest degree capable of self-
government in the nation, have found the greatest difficulty in
coping successfully and economically with the problem of local
government in the great cities. This may be accounted for, how-
ever, more because of the novelty of the problem presented than
on account of any inherent defect in the democratic principle,
although it is probable that the latter has been carried beyond its
legitimate field. The growth of our cities has been rapid and of
recent date. In 1790 there were but thirteen cities having a pop-
ulation of more than five thousand and none had attained a size of
forty thousand itnhabitants. The growth of a city from such a
size to one numbering nearly two millions within the space of one
hundred years is something of which history furnishes no prece-
dent; but more wonderful still has been the rise of cities through-
out the West, to-day numbering hundreds of thousands of inhabi-
tants where but little more than fifty years ago stood the outposts
of the nation.
This growth of our cities has presented problems which may
well have engaged the attention and earnest endeavor of the
brightest minds, but they have been neglected in the magnitude
of the issues and the wider field of action which the affairs of the
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general government have offered. The result has been that
municipal matters have been left to the petty schemer or the cor-
rupt politician and offices *have too long been treated as the legiti-
mate reward for political services to those who have been raised
thereby to greater honors and influence in the State or nation.
Of recent years, however, corruption and extravagance in munici-
pal affairs have become so wide-spread and so notorious that popu-
lar interest has been aroused, but as usual the remedies suggested
have been so numerous and so antagonistic that they have but
served to render the subject more confusing and difficult. One
result has been to take from the municipalities many of their
powers and to restrict them in the exercise of those which remain ;
in short, to pronounce them incapable of self-government and vest
a general oversight in the State legislature. Or, if this has not
resulted, the legislature has so interfered in the management of
local affairs by amending, repealing and enacting laws which
henceforth become a part of their charter, that local responsibility
has been lessened and the chief check in the interest of good
government thereby lost. Never was there a greater fallacy than
that a cure for all municipal ills is to be found in legislation. All
attempts at reform to be effective must strike at the root of the
-evil, a fact which has too long been lost sight of.
With a healthy public sentiment aroused and awake to its own
interests, the ideal government would be that which allowed the
greatest freedom of action to the municipality- which gave home
rule in its truest sense. Such sentiment will never be aroused
when people feel that their efforts are futile and that their actions
are controlled by the State government. In this respect New
York perhaps furnishes the best example, where even such sub-
jects as a street railroad franchise, a driveway in Central Park, or
the sweeping of the streets, must be passed upon at Albany, and
in a less degree this may be said to be the condition in many of
our States.
The first remedy then to be suggested is a limitation upon the
power of the State legislature to interfere in municipal affairs,
and this can be attained only by constitutional amendments.
Without such limitation the power of the legislature over munici-
pal corporations is practically unlimited, save in a very few mat-
ters in which such corporations may acquire vested rights as
against the State, and to such extent stand upon the same grounds
as private corporations. "Political powers conferred upon a cor-
poration for the local government of a place are not vested rights
as against the State, and where there are no constitutional restric-
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tions upon the action of the legislature it has absolute control to
create, change, modify or destroy them at pleasure." I
Provisions are found in many of the State constitutions evi-
dently intended to so restrict the action of the legislature, by
requiring all acts relating to municipal corporations to be general
in their nature and forbidding the passage of special acts.
Whether I am correct in this interpretation of the spirit of such
provisions or not, they have been generally avoided by the classi-
fication of cities into grades and classes. When such classes are
changed and altered from time to time and care is taken that but
one city within the State shall conform to each particular class,
special legislation is as assuredly accomplished as though such
prohibition were not contained in the constitution, yet this is
sanctioned by the courts.2 Under such a limitation and such an
interpretation in Ohio, "ripper legislation," as it is known, occu-
pies a considerable portion of the time of each legislature. Dur-
ing the sessions of the Sixty-ninth General Assembly ripper bills
were passed materially altering the charters of Cleveland, Colum-
bus and Cincinnati in addition to many of the smaller cities. To
the former was granted a charter long sought for and urgently
demanded by-a majority of its citizens; from the latter was taken
away its self-government in a large degree, vesting it in a board
of commissioners appointed by the Governor. This board existed
six months when the law was repealed at a special session of the
legislature called for that purpose, so great was the corruption of
this non-partisan, State-appointed board. So much for this abso-
lute control of the legislature and the wisdom which actuates its.
exercise.
Private corporations are especially protected by the Constitu-
tion of the United States and of each State, while the municipal
corporation involving the comfort and interests of a multitude of
people and the raising and expenditure of vast sums of money
annually is rendered unstable and insecure by virtue of this con-
stant liability to interference on the part of the State legislature.
One State only, however, has seen fit to place any effectual limi-
tation on the action of the legislative authority in this respect.
The constitution of California provides that any city containing a
population of over ten thousand may frame a charter for its own
government consistent with, and subject to, the constitution and
1 Municipal Corporations - x Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law 976. See also,
People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532 ; Daily v. St. Paul, 7 Minn. 39o.
2 State v. Hawkins, 45 0. St- ioS, and cases cited.
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laws of the State. If approved by the majority of the electors of
such city it must be submitted to the legislature for its approval
or rejection as a whole, without power of alteration or amend-
ment ; and if approved it becomes henceforth the charter of such
city and can only be amended by a similar process.
8 This provi-
sion certainly accomplishes the desired end. It is a question,
however, if it is not more stringent than the interests of good
municipal government demand, yet it cannot be doubted that in
leaving the entire responsibility in local affairs with those most
deeply interested in the proper management of the corporation,
viz., the inhabitants themselves, the best results have been
obtained and such a constitutional limitation must eventually be
copied in many of the Eastern States.
A second very fruitful cause of corruption in our cities has
been the division of responsibility, or rather the total lack of it.
The system of government by boards of commissioners, each
looking after a certain portion of the city's affairs, is one which
has largely prevailed in the large cities. A method less fitted to
the conduct of the affairs of a municipality could hardly be
devised, where power is divided among a dozen or more boards of
equal authority, elected by the people, and each supreme in its
sphere. Cleveland, the most recent city to abolish boards, fur-
nishes an example of the system. Prior to April 6, i89i, Cleve-
land was a board-ridden city with all that the word implies ; in
addition to the council, mayor and other officials there were fifteen
boards of commissioners, elected or appointed in various ways,
each independent of every other authority save a very slight over-
sight which existed in the council. Each of these boards was
composed of five members, as a rule, serving without pay ; each
exercised legislative and executive functions within its sphere and
constituted a court for the trial of subordinates by a species of
impeachment; each purchased its supplies and dispensed its ovn
revenues. Under such a system there can be no. such thing as.
responsibility, where each member of a board may cast the
responsibility upon his fellow members and where the board itself
may fall back on the council or mayor, or vice versa, as the case
may be.
One hundred years ago the supreme executive authority of the
nation was placed in the hands of one man -the president -and
the legislative, separate and distinct from the executive, in Con-
3 Constitution of California, Art. X, Sec. 8, as amended Apr. x2, 1887.
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gress. Such a division was justified by history, and its wisdom
has been again proven in its results, yet its application to cities
has been of recent date. The foundation princple of all municipal
government should be direct responsiblity; it matters not where such
is vested, but it should be vested somewhere so that the public
voice can say "Here is the responsible party." Acting upon this
idea, we find most of the recent reform movements casting upon
the mayor this personal responsibility and in him is certainly the
most fitting place for it. In him should be vested the appoint-
ment of his assistants and all inferior officials, with perhaps a
power of confirmation of the heads of departments only vested in
the council. From the council should be taken all executive func-
tions and its duties restricted solely to legitimate legislation, the
voting of taxes and ordering of improvements. Such a remedy,
to be sure, is of the heroic order, but it would have the effect of
arousing the public to the necessity of electing only the most able
men to office and the salary should be sufficiently large, in addi-
tion to the powers conferred, to attract the best men in the com-
munity. In case of inefficiency or corruption at any rate, under
such a system the people have but themselves to blame. The
remedy is in their own hands, and, it has been said, no people are
worthy of any better government, State or municipal, than they
themselves want. If they sit quietly by beholding corruption in
office, it may be assumed that such is what they desire or at least
that they are content with it.
By limiting the suffrage too to the election of the council and
mayor the attention of the people is concentrated upon the candi-
date for but two offices (councilmen being elected by districts)
with the result that, the number being so few, the people may
easily inform themselves as to the merits of each and choose
understandingly at the polls. When the whole government must
stand or fall with its responsible head, a much stronger blow for
good government may be struck at a single election, than if a
dozen or more officials are dependent upon the popular vote and
-each must be removed in turn, perhaps at different elections. As
far back as x87I Mr. Charles Nordhoff attributed nearly all evils
in municipal government to this cause alone. In an article in the
Nmorth American Review of that year he said: "The folly of oblig-
ing the people to decide at the polls upon the fitness for office of a
great number of persons, lies at the bottom of nearly all the mis-
government from which we suffer, not only in the cities but in
the State. It is a darling device of the political jobbers and a
-most successful one; for under the hollow pretence that thus the
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people have greater power, they are able to crush public spirit, to
disgust decent and conscientious citizens with politics, to arrange
their 'slates,' to mix the rascals judiciously with a few honest
men whenever public sentiment imperatively demands that much,
and to force their stacked cards upon the people." 4
In connection with these reforms the term of office of the
mayor, and likewise in the administrative departments, should be
lengthened. Indeed the only excuse which can be offered for
annual elections is to be found in the proposition that all office-
holders are thieves, and it is therefore necessary to change them
once a year ; in other words that municipal government is an evil
to be tolerated, since necessary, but that the least harm is done
when changes are frequent. Only endless confusion can result
from such constant rotation in office ; men of ability will not be
attracted to the public service, extensive reforms cannot be insti-
tuted, and no permanent policy can be developed when the tenure
of office is so uncertain and so short as it is to-day in many of our
cities.
The analogy of municipal to private corporations is very great,
and the nearer that analogy can be carried out, the better will be
our municipal governments. Municipal corporations are defined
to be "bodies politic and corporate * * * established by law to
assist in the civil government of the country, but chiefly to regu-
late and administer the local or internal affairs of the city, town
or district which is incorporated." 5 The former duties are slight
and inconsiderable when compared to the latter. The laws of the
State and by-laws of the city are administered by the State judi-
ciary or by city courts which either are, or should be, a part of
the former. Of the executive departments that of police is the
only one whose duties are in any considerable degree directly con-
cerned with the civil government of the country. The affairs of
the other departments bear a close resemblance to those of a large
corporation, a fact too often lost sight of in the past. Exercising
business rather than political or civil functions, the methods of
business should be introduced into their management of affairs-
a reform which no amount of legislation can attain, but which
must be dependent in a large degree upon a public sentiment
which shall demand fitness and ability as the prerequisite for
office, whether elective or appointive, rather than party affilia-
4 "The Misgovernment of New York-A Remedy Suggested." N. A.
Rev., Oct. 1871, p. 327.
5 i Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 26.
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tions. The departments must be conducted as parts of one whole
rather than as separate corporations in themselves. They must
act together and in harmony with each other, cooperate in the
purchase of supplies and in every way work in the common inter-
est of the public for whose convenience and coiifort they prima-
rily exist. To accomplish this result, as far as it lies in the power
of legislation to accomplish it, the new charter of Cleveland con-
tains a very salutary provision to the effect that the heads of
departments shall constitute what is known as the Board of Con-
trol, who shall meet for consultation at least twice each week, and
",shall consult and cooperate in such way as to adopt and follow
a systematic method to secure the most economical purchase of
supplies for all departments, at uniform rates throughout." 6
Such a provision in municipal charters cannot fail to check in a
large degree the wasteful and extravagant expenditures of money
which arise from a want of codperation even where corrupt
-motives are absent.
But one other remedy remains to be suggested which may
seem to many a revival of mediavalism, but which is but the
logical outcome of the enormous growth of our cities and must be
thoughtfully considered as our cities become more populous and
wealthy. That question is the restriction of the suffrage so as to
secure property representation in cities. Viewed strictly as a cor-
poration there is no more reason why all the inhabitants of a city
should have an equal voice in the management of municipal
affairs, than that the owner of one share, or none, in a private
corporation should have an equal voice with him who owned an
hundred. As in private corporations there should be a real iden-
tity of interest between the governing body and the governed,
and such cannot exist when a mere majority of numbers may
control the action of the city and recklessly appropriate moneys
for improvements the burden of which must ultimately fall upon
the property owners, who are the real tax-payers. The problem
is rendered difficult by the fact that certain political and civil
powers devolve upon the corporation and the consequent necessity
of preserving these as well as the property rights of its members.
This distinction has been clearly pointed out and the rights of
property acknowledged by as conservative a legal writer as Judge
Dillon, who divides the powers of municipal corporations into two
classes, "(i) those which relate to health, good government, effi-
6 Municipal Charter of Cleveland, Sees. i6, 68. Vol. 88 Ohio Laws, pp.
109, 117.
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cient police, etc., in which all have an equal interest and should
'have an equal voice, (2) those which directly involve the expendi-
ture of money, and especially those relating to local improvements,
the expense of which ultimately falls upon the property owners.
As respects these, the controlling voice should be with those who
have to bear the burden. ' The charge that such a restriction
would be un-American and undemocratic was ably answered in
the report to the legislature of the New York Commission, which
was appointed in 1876 to recommend needed reforms in the
municipal government of New York city, as follows :
"No surer method could be devised to bring the principle of universal
suffrage into discredit and prepare the way for its overthrow than to pervert it to
a use for which it was never intended and subject it to a service which it is
incapable of performing. * * * To expect frugality and economy in financial
concerns from its operation in great cities, where perhaps half of the inhabi-
tants feel no interest in these subjects, is to subject the principle to a strain
which it cannot bear. All the friends of the system should unite in rescuing it
from such perils." 8
Universal suffrage may be possible in the local affairs of the
smaller cities where the electors generally possess a personal
knowledge of the ability of each candidate for office, where the
distinctions of wealth are not great, where the possession of prop-
erty does not necessarily indicate superior intelligence or compar-
ative poverty the lack of it, where the idle and worthless do not
collect in large numbers and in distinct quarters, and where
municipal expenditures are small and the opportunities for job-
bery and corruption slight. Where, however, the opposite of this
exists, as it must necessarily exist, in a greater or less degree, in
the larger cities, the folly of entrusting the expenditure of hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars annually in the hands of a body of
men, who are but barely able to look after their own affairs, is
apparent. This class become the willing tools in the hands of
unscrupulous politicians ; having no personal interest in the eco-
nomical management of affairs, nothing to lose in the wasteful,
taxes have no terrors for them and their vote is most easily influ-
.enced, if not corruptly purchasable for a consideration. Were the
rights of property owners recognized in New York such an organ-
ization as Tammany could not exist, maintained in office as it is
largely by the votes of those resident in the tenement-house dis-
trict of the East Side, who bear but an infinitesimal part of the
7 1 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 23.
.8 Report of the New York Commission, 1877, page 4o.
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burdens of local taxation. How such representation of property
owners is to be secured is a question which will require the most
serious study and wise and most careful legislative action, but is
beyond the limits of the present discussion.
In conclusion, then, to briefly summarize, better municipal
government demands (i) constitutional limitations upon the action
of the legislature in local affairs, (2) the abolition of the board
system and the vesting of responsibility in the mayor, (3) the sep-
aration of the legislative and executive functions, really included
in the second, (4) restriction of the number of elective offices, (5)
lengthening and rendering more certain the tenure of office, (6)
the introduction of business methods and the exclusion of petty
politics in municipal management, and finally (7) restrictions upon
the suffrage so as to secure the proper representation of those
upon whom in the end falls the burden of expense.
